
**A-level
HISTORY
7042/2P**

Component 2P The Transformation of China, 1936-1997

Mark scheme

June 2020

Version: 1.0 Final



2 0 6 A 7 0 4 2 / 2 P / M S

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, i.e. if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A

- 0 | 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the political situation in China in the years 1976 to 1978.

[30 marks]

Target: A02

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **25-30**
- L4:** Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **19-24**
- L3:** Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **13-18**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **7-12**
- L1:** The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1-6**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- Deng was a long-serving senior political figure within the CCP but had again fallen from grace in March 1976 after the Tiananmen Square incident, and so was writing to the Central Committee as a political outsider
- the purpose of Deng's letter is to seek rehabilitation from the CCP by congratulating Hua Guofeng and so show loyalty to the Party's leadership
- at the time the letter was written Mao had only just died, and the CCP's leadership was in a state of flux, with a challenge having just been made by Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, so the CCP would be extremely sensitive about issues of loyalty
- the tone is flattering and excited, valuable as it shows Deng is trying to curry favour with the Party.

Content and argument

- Deng is supportive of Hua Guofeng's appointment as Chairman of the CCPO (and of the Military Affairs Committee) after Mao's death. He is bound to say this, as Deng had been marginalised for much of the Cultural Revolution and was in the political wilderness. In order to return to favour, he would have to claim loyalty to its leaders
- the reference to Hua's 'age' is possibly a veiled criticism of his relative inexperience compared to Deng, who was one of the few remaining CCP 'old guard' and had worked with Mao for decades, whilst Hua had been a relatively minor figure until his elevation during the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, and at Deng's expense
- the CCP has moved deftly against potential opposition after Mao's death, having 'triumphed' over them. The arrest of the Gang of Four was probably the catalyst for Deng's letter, as they had been his major critics and Deng was seizing an opportunity
- Deng's enthusiasm at the 'triumph of the socialist road over the capitalist road' is likely to be insincere, since Deng was one of the key figures accused of being a 'capitalist roader' by Mao himself and had pragmatic economic policies, so the source only goes so far in portraying Deng's real views about the political situation in China and his personal ambitions.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:**Provenance, tone and emphasis**

- Hua had been the Chairman of the CCP since Mao's death but had long been a relatively minor figure in the Party, so will be taking the opportunity at a major conference to set out his vision as leader
- by early 1977, his position as leader nonetheless seemed fairly secure; the Gang of Four were languishing in prison and Deng Xiaoping had not yet assumed any key posts in the government
- the purpose of the source is to celebrate the Party's achievements since Mao's death, and given the wide range of delegates at the conference, Hua is disseminating Party policy with the understanding that delegates will in turn distribute this across China
- the tone is deferential towards the ideas of Mao, valuable in showing Hua's own dedication to those ideas and of continuing with them.

Content and argument

- the CCP will continue with Mao's vision for China, and celebrate his legacy. This is hardly surprising since Hua's position as Chairman was based on his appointment on Mao's deathbed as his successor, and as Hua lacked any substantial support base in China he is bound to play up his connections with Mao
- the Gang of Four's influence in China needs to be eliminated, with much work having been done to 'expose and criticise' them. 'Relentlessly Criticise the Gang of Four' was indeed a government campaign in 1977, and their censorship of Chinese culture had been partly reversed. The source does not show how this in turn led to 'scar literature' that denounced the harshness of the Cultural Revolution which would undermine the position of men like Hua, who sought to impose 'the verdict of the Cultural Revolution'
- Hua's reference to 'Learning from Dazhai' shows his reliance on the economic ideas of Mao, since Dazhai had long been used by Mao as a model in agriculture. His rhetoric that slavishly followed Mao's ideas was sarcastically referred to as the 'Two Whatevers'
- in fact, Hua was using Mao's legacy to his own ends. Whilst Mao would certainly have approved of Hua's claims that 'the class struggle is the key link', he had always denounced Lenin's mausoleum in Russia and would have been deeply unhappy about the way he himself was treated in death with a 'memorial hall' displaying his body.

Source C: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:**Provenance, tone and emphasis**

- by late 1978, the structure of the Central Committee had changed compared with 1976. Deng had been almost fully rehabilitated into the Party. He received a senior Party role in late 1977 and, a few weeks before this meeting, the Central Committee had reversed their criticism of Deng's role in the Tiananmen Square incident. Deng and his supporters on the Central Committee were well placed by this point to challenge Hua for Party leadership
- the purpose of the source is to criticise past policies and advocate the 'four modernisations', and given how much influence Deng had in the Central Committee by this point it was bound to. In this, the Central Committee was assisted by the many old Party members who had also been rehabilitated by December 1978, making such a 'forward' speech possible
- given the select audience, the records of the meeting are more candid than they otherwise might be, which helps understand why it is able to make statements about 'phoney Marxism'
- the tone is critical ('Chairman Mao was not free from fault'), valuable in showing how strong Deng's influence in the Central Committee was by the end of 1978 and how much the position of Hua had weakened.

Content and argument

- the CCP needed to change direction and ‘seek truth from facts’ rather than heedlessly following the ideas of Mao and the ways of the Cultural Revolution. Deng and his supporters believed strongly in the ‘four modernisations’ and this depended on improved education to advance science and technology rather than an ideological class struggle
- whilst Mao had been essential in creating ‘new China’, he had not always been correct. Deng and many of his Central Committee colleagues had been victims of the Cultural Revolution, and the call to ‘emancipate our minds’ was based on embracing new ideas rather than following old ones. In this, the Central Committee were placing themselves directly at odds with Hua
- in fact, these arguments were highly persuasive, since the Third Plenum fully endorsed this position and renounced class struggle as the Party’s central focus and adopted Deng’s modernising agenda, showing the strength of Deng’s faction and arguments in the Central Committee and in China by late 1978
- the source’s key limitation is that it does not show how much of the confidence behind this speech came from the growing groundswell of support from Deng among young people in urban China, with big character posters appearing in Beijing supportive of the ‘four modernisations’. In fact, some of these people were to be disappointed in their hopes that Deng would introduce some form of democracy in China.

Section B

0 | 2 ‘In the years 1936 to 1946, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed radically.’

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that in the years 1936 to 1946, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed radically might include:

- in terms of its support base and the areas under its control, the CCP underwent significant expansion by 1946. GMD cruelty and Japanese oppression pushed many towards the CCP; by 1946 the Party controlled areas with a population of around 90 million. This marked a significant change from the small Party that was struggling to survive in 1936
- there was radical change in the CCP leadership during the period, and events like the discrediting of the Young Bolsheviks, desertion of leaders like Zhang Guotao and the Rectification Campaign in Yan'an between 1942 and 1944 led to Mao Zedong emerging as the unopposed leader of the CCP by 1946
- aspects of CCP ideology underwent radical change during this period to increase class participation; developments like the creation of policy based on the 'mass line' and learning from the people together with the incorporation of the 'national bourgeoisie' as a revolutionary class created a more inclusive Party by 1946 than in 1936
- the organisation of the CCP changed radically as a result of the Second United Front; the CCP transitioned from fighting against the GMD to fighting alongside it against the Japanese and so gained an important period of respite from Jiang's fierce extermination campaigns.

Arguments challenging the view that in the years 1936 to 1946, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed radically might include:

- the CCP's support base was overwhelmingly drawn from the peasants between 1936 and 1946. They operated in almost exclusively rural areas, their policies such as land reform were aimed at the peasants and most new CCP cadres were drawn from the peasantry. Whilst the CCP expanded its support and control, it did so in agricultural areas since the GMD and the Japanese controlled China's cities
- despite the Second United Front, CCP organisation had to take account of hostility from the GMD throughout the period, with the GMD renewing their blockade of Yan'an by 1939 and the example of the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941. Although in theory the Civil War did not recommence until 1946, in practice hostilities never truly ceased
- Soviet attempts to influence the CCP continued throughout the period and relations with the USSR were often tense, with Soviet pressure resulting in Jiang Jieshi not being executed during the X'ian Incident and Stalin recognising the GMD as the official government of China
- although his power increased during this period, Mao consistently influenced the CCP between 1936 and 1946. He was widely seen as being responsible for the creation of the CCP base at Yan'an and it was his peasant-driven policies that the Party used.

The CCP did undergo radical changes in the years 1936 to 1946, and whilst some things remained consistent, the effect of these changes was to make the Party a far more credible one by 1946. Instead of struggling to survive, by 1946 the CCP was a genuine contender with the GMD for political power in China showing how collectively significant the changes the Party were.

- 0 | 3** To what extent was Mao responsible for the Sino-Soviet split in the years 1952 to 1962?
[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

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- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that Mao was responsible for the Sino-Soviet split in the years 1952 to 1962 might include:

- the attitude of Mao towards Khrushchev made a split more likely. Mao took Khrushchev's 'secret speech' denouncing Stalin personally, and saw it as a criticism of his own methods of ruling. Mao's own paranoia led him to be wary of Khrushchev and clouded his dealings with the Soviet leader, creating issues between the two
- by 1953, China had emerged from the Korean War, successfully fighting the USA and its UN allies to a standstill for three years. Whilst this damaged China's economy, it made Mao more confident in China's abilities and less likely to accept that the Soviet Union was the lead partner in their relationship and this mind-set destabilised relations
- Mao deliberately humiliated Khrushchev during his visit to China in 1958, in retaliation for what he believed to be his own humiliating treatment at Stalin's hands years earlier. The Soviet delegation was accommodated in an uncomfortable hotel and Khrushchev had to attend an awkward meeting with Mao at a swimming pool. He returned to the USSR furious, and critical of China
- China had serious ideological differences with the USSR in foreign policy, and Mao was unhappy with many of Khrushchev's actions. He accused the USSR of being soft and in 1960 produced a paper criticising 'peaceful co-existence', which brought the split into the open
- Mao's wider foreign policy decisions were also responsible for the split. China's economic support for Albania in the early 1960s after Albania rejected Soviet control was a clear sign that China was prepared to defy and oppose the Soviet Union in foreign affairs. This action contributed to the rivalry between the two.

Arguments challenging the view that Mao was responsible for the Sino-Soviet split in the years 1952 to 1962 might include:

- in the early years after CCP victory in the Civil War, the USSR acted in such a way that China felt like a junior partner, and this caused resentment in the years to come. For example, the Sino-Soviet Treaty spoke of mutual friendship but demanded the repayment of loans to China and payment for the thousands of Soviet advisors sent to China. This, together with the Soviet asset-stripping of Manchuria, made Mao feel inferior and contributed to the split
- despite implying to Mao that the USSR would enter the Korean War, China had fought UN forces alone for three years, and whilst the Soviets provided military equipment it was less than expected and 'had to be paid for to the last bullet'. This led to concerns that Stalin had deliberately set out to weaken China, and caused tensions between the two nations
- the Soviets increased friction between the two Communist powers when they refused to provide military support to China when it began shelling the Taiwanese island of Quemoy in response to the US placing missiles in Taiwan. Khrushchev's claim that Mao was acting recklessly did nothing to improve relations
- Khrushchev was deeply critical of the Great Leap Forward, which abandoned Soviet economic methods, and in 1960 withdrew Soviet advisors from China. In turn, Mao blamed this for the failure of the Leap, and by the end of the year the Sino-Soviet split was obvious to see
- Soviet military aid to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War demonstrated to Mao that the USSR was seeking new allies to replace China, and sealed the split.

The long-term way in which the USSR viewed and acted towards China created the possibility of the Sino-Soviet split, but it was Mao's interpretation of Soviet actions that caused it to actually occur.

Although Khrushchev was critical of Mao, much of this occurred because of Mao's own actions and this destabilised the relationship.

0 | 4 'The Cultural Revolution was launched to increase Mao Zedong's personal power.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

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Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the Cultural Revolution was launched to increase Mao Zedong's personal power might include:

- Mao believed that since the failure of the Great Leap Forward his power and influence in the CCP had dwindled; he had given up his position as Chairman and had distanced himself from the Party. The Cultural Revolution was a means to restore his position at the top of the Party
- the CCP was dominated by the 'pragmatists' like Liu and Deng, whose policies of economic reform were not in keeping with Mao's beliefs in mass mobilisation of the people. The Cultural Revolution aimed to undermine the pragmatists and return Party policy to that of Mao's vision for China which would mark a significant shift in the direction the CCP was moving in
- the personality cult that developed in the first year of the Cultural Revolution aimed to increase Mao's support, especially among young people who would be its engine. The Little Red Book and Mao's swim in the Yangtze River showed Mao to be forceful and energetic and the support this garnered from the Red Guards increased Mao's personal power
- Mao struggled to accept any form of criticism. He believed that intellectuals saw him as their enemy and saw parallels between the play 'Hai Rui dismissed from Office' and his own conflict with Peng Dehuai. The Cultural Revolution aimed to eliminate the intellectuals and members of the Party who could or might criticise him
- by indoctrinating the Red Guards with Maoist ideology through mass rallies and the 'Bombard the Headquarters' *dazibao* together with appointing the loyalist Lin Biao as his successor, Mao aimed to create a China that would follow Mao Zedong Thought long after he passed away. He was preserving his personal authority through his legacy in order to make himself significant even after death.

Arguments challenging the view that the Cultural Revolution was launched to increase Mao Zedong's personal power might include:

- Mao believed that through the policies of Liu and Deng, the CCP had lost its initial enthusiasm and the revolution had been 'blown off course'. He worried that the younger members of the Party had no connection with revolutionary struggle. The Cultural Revolution aimed to deepen the revolution through mass mobilisation; this went beyond a simple desire for personal power
- the economic reforms of the early 1960s had created a system that Mao believed was elitist, with a focus on training specialists and a growing bureaucracy. The Cultural Revolution aimed to turn the people against the CCP elites and return the revolution to the peasants, significant in giving it back to the people rather than in the hands of the Party leadership
- Mao was concerned about the direction the Soviet Union had taken in the 1960s and believed that Khrushchev and then Brezhnev had betrayed Socialism. The Cultural Revolution aimed to reinvigorate socialism in China to avoid it following the Soviet model. This was significant beyond a simple desire for personal power
- the huge social upheaval that the Cultural Revolution aimed to undertake was significant beyond Mao's own power and aimed to completely transform Chinese society through the removal of the 'four olds', introduction of socialist culture and by transforming the education system in China. These attacks were sponsored by the CCRG rather than Mao, showing it went beyond his personal ambitions.

Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, and whilst many of its aims widened and transcended his own desire for personal power, the net significance of these aims would have been to create a China that was so radically transformed that it would have been almost impossible to challenge Mao Zedong Thought.

Even if Mao did not plan all of it thus, the net effect of all these aims would have destroyed traditional Chinese society and much of the Party, thus increasing his personal power.